Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Mon, 31 August 2020 18:33 UTC

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Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 11:33:41 -0700
From: David Schinazi <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)
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@DavidSchinazi commented on this pull request.



> +what packets the peer sends and where these packets are sent. If an attacker
+can target a vulnerable service with a controlled payload, that service might
+perform actions that are attributed to the attacker's peer, but decided by the
+attacker.
+
+For example, cross-site request forgery {{?CSRF=DOI.10.1145/1455770.1455782}}
+exploits on the Web cause a client to issue requests that include authorization
+cookies {{?COOKIE=RFC6265}}, allowing one site access to information and
+actions that are intended to be restricted to a different site.
+
+As QUIC runs over UDP, the primary attack modality of concern is one where an
+attacker can select the address to which its peer sends UDP datagrams and can
+control some of the unprotected content of those packets. As much of the data
+sent by QUIC endpoints is protected, this includes control over ciphertext. An
+attack is successful if an attacker can cause a peer to send a UDP datagram to
+a host that will perform some action based on content in the datagram.

I'm not trying to shame anyone. I'm trying to ascertain whether this change is the right one: we're worsening the performance of the protocol (by requiring extra round-trips in some scenarios) and if the attack is purely theoretical then we shouldn't do that. Having a concrete example of actual harm would help motivate the performance degradation.

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