Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] rate-limiting of CID issuance needs to be allowed (#2436)

Christian Huitema <notifications@github.com> Fri, 08 February 2019 07:38 UTC

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Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2019 07:38:22 +0000
From: Christian Huitema <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] rate-limiting of CID issuance needs to be allowed (#2436)
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Yes, I think rate limit is a plausible solution. But the malicious clients can also set up a connection, get half a dozen CID, then set a new connection, etc. So it boils down to how many connection per second the server will support (100? 1000? 10000? Multiply by size of farm?) and how often the CID encryption key will rotate. That, multiplied by the number of CID per connection, gives a number. Log2 of that gives the minimum size in bits. For a server doing 10000 connections per second, 16 CID per connection, 24 hours for the key, the result is 34 bits. Add 2 for managing key rotations, then add routing bits in the case of a farm. We should be good with 40 bits for a single server, 56 bits for a small farm, 64 bits for a larger farm.

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