Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Early CONNECTION_CLOSE fixes (#3440)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Wed, 04 March 2020 00:39 UTC

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Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2020 16:38:56 -0800
From: Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Early CONNECTION_CLOSE fixes (#3440)
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janaiyengar commented on this pull request.

A few suggestions, but overall looks good!

> @@ -415,12 +415,18 @@ A QUIC client starts TLS by requesting TLS handshake bytes from TLS.  The client
 acquires handshake bytes before sending its first packet.  A QUIC server starts
 the process by providing TLS with the client's handshake bytes.
 
-At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending encryption
-level and receiving encryption level. Each encryption level is associated with a
-different flow of bytes, which is reliably transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO
-frames. When TLS provides handshake bytes to be sent, they are appended to the
-current flow and any packet that includes the CRYPTO frame is protected using
-keys from the corresponding encryption level.
+At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending
+encryption level and receiving encryption level. Encryption levels correspond
+roughly to packet number spaces and determine the packet type and keys that are
+used for protecting data.
+
+Each encryption level is associated with a different flow of bytes, which is
+reliably transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO frames. When TLS provides handshake
+bytes to be sent, they are appended to the current flow and any packet that

```suggestion
bytes to be sent, they are appended to the current flow. Any packet that
```

> +encryption level and receiving encryption level. Encryption levels correspond
+roughly to packet number spaces and determine the packet type and keys that are
+used for protecting data.

```suggestion
encryption level and receiving encryption level. Encryption levels determine
the packet type and keys that are used for protecting data.
```

(moved this below to be more precise.)

> +0-RTT, Handshake, and 1-RTT packets. CRYPTO frames are carried in just three of
+these levels, omitting the 0-RTT level.

```suggestion
0-RTT, Handshake, and 1-RTT packets. CRYPTO frames are carried in just three of
these levels, omitting the 0-RTT level. These four levels correspond to three packet
number spaces: Initial and Handshake encrypted packets use their own separate
spaces, and 0-RTT and 1-RTT encrypted packets use one other space. 
```

> @@ -1364,12 +1364,11 @@ by the frames that are typically contained in those packets. So, for instance
 the first packet is of type Initial, with packet number 0, and contains a CRYPTO
 frame carrying the ClientHello.
 
-Note that multiple QUIC packets -- even of different encryption levels -- may be
+Note that multiple QUIC packets -- even of different packet types -- can be

Take-it-or-leave-it suggestion: It seems useful to say here that different encryption levels can be coalesced. Perhaps retain this old text here?

>  coalesced into a single UDP datagram (see {{packet-coalesce}}), and so this
 handshake may consist of as few as 4 UDP datagrams, or any number more. For
-instance, the server's first flight contains packets from the Initial encryption
-level (obfuscation), the Handshake level, and "0.5-RTT data" from the server at
-the 1-RTT encryption level.
+instance, the server's first flight contains Initial packets (obfuscation),

```suggestion
instance, the server's first flight contains Initial packets,
```

>  coalesced into a single UDP datagram (see {{packet-coalesce}}), and so this
 handshake may consist of as few as 4 UDP datagrams, or any number more. For
-instance, the server's first flight contains packets from the Initial encryption
-level (obfuscation), the Handshake level, and "0.5-RTT data" from the server at
-the 1-RTT encryption level.
+instance, the server's first flight contains Initial packets (obfuscation),
+Handshake packets, and "0.5-RTT data" in packets with a short header.

```suggestion
Handshake packets, and "0.5-RTT data" in 1-RTT packets with a short header.
```

> +An CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1d MUST be replaced by a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type
+0x1c when sending the frame in Initial packets. Otherwise, information about
+the application state might be revealed. Endpoints MUST clear the value of the
+Reason Phrase field and SHOULD use the APPLICATION_ERROR code when converting
+to a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1c.

```suggestion
Sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1d in an Initial packet might reveal application
state to third parties. To avoid this leakage, a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1d MUST
be replaced by a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1c when sending the frame in Initial
packets. Endpoints MUST clear the value of the Reason Phrase field and SHOULD use
the APPLICATION_ERROR code when converting to a CONNECTION_CLOSE of type 0x1c.
```

>  
-A client will always know whether the server has Handshake keys (see
-{{discard-initial}}), but it is possible that a server does not know whether the
-client has Handshake keys.  Under these circumstances, a server SHOULD send a
-CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in both Handshake and Initial packets to ensure that at
-least one of them is processable by the client.  Similarly, a peer might be
-unable to read 1-RTT packets, so an endpoint SHOULD send CONNECTION_CLOSE in
-Handshake and 1-RTT packets prior to confirming the handshake.  These packets
-can be coalesced into a single UDP datagram; see {{packet-coalesce}}.
+CONNECTION_CLOSE frames sent in multiple packets can be coalesced into a single

```suggestion
CONNECTION_CLOSE frames sent in multiple packets types can be coalesced into a single
```

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