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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Permit 0-RTT after Retry and VN (#1514)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Fri, 06 July 2018 04:47 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Permit 0-RTT after Retry and VN (#1514)
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mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -601,6 +601,11 @@ the packet.  This prevents an off-path attacker from injecting a Retry packet.
 The client responds to a Retry packet with Initial packet that includes the
 provided Retry Token to continue connection establishment.
 
+A client MAY attempt 0-RTT after receiving a Retry packet by sending 0-RTT
+packets to the connection ID provided by the server.  A client that sends
+additional 0-RTT packets MUST NOT reset the packet number to 0 after a Retry
+packet, see {{retry-0rtt-pn}}.
+

Me neither - the thought was to use the dcid given in the retry - which could lead to a target that does not accept the tokens. But dcid cannot change from when tikens were forged.

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