Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Flow control for post-handshake CRYPTO messages (#1834)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Fri, 05 October 2018 02:15 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Flow control for post-handshake CRYPTO messages (#1834)
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> The client can now send a bunch of post-handshake messages to the server which the server cannot process until it receives ClientFinished, so it has to buffer them. We should bound that buffer somehow.

Isn't the expected behavior of the server to drop the 1-RTT packets containing the post-handshake messages until it receives the ClientFinished (that activates the 1-RTT read key)?

To put it another way, my understanding is that you _can_ have any size of buffer you want to better cope with packet reordering, but that happens per-packet rather than per-frame (because it's not just the post-handshake messages that cannot be trusted prior to receiving ClientFinished), and that the buffer can be arbitrary sized because you can drop it to trigger a retransmit.

Am I missing something?

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