Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Does a Retry really need to change the CID? (#2837)

Nick Banks <> Mon, 24 June 2019 14:39 UTC

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From: Nick Banks <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Does a Retry really need to change the CID? (#2837)
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Generally, I believe the goal is to prevent all unauthorized tampering with the handshake. If it happens, it should be detected and the handshake fails. I agree with this philosophy even though it does make the Retry scenario a bit trickier to offload.

Also, even if that was allowed, designing a DDoS device around it would be tricky still. You'd have to handle the case where the peer only pads their packet up to 1200 bytes **including the token**, so if you removed it, the backend server wouldn't accept it.

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