Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] clarify the scope of a NEW_TOKEN token (#3156)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Thu, 14 November 2019 09:57 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] clarify the scope of a NEW_TOKEN token (#3156)
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mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1698,10 +1698,15 @@ encrypted form in the token.
 It is unlikely that the client port number is the same on two different
 connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to be successful.
 
-If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous connection
-to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD include that value in the
-Token field of its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to
-validate the client address without an additional round trip.
+A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable to any server that the
+connection is considered authoritative for (e.g., server names included in the
+certificate).  When connecting to a server for which the client retains an
+applicable and unused token, it SHOULD include that token in the Token field of
+its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to validate the
+client address without an additional round trip.  A client MUST NOT include a
+token that is not applicable to the server that it is connecting to, unless the
+client has the knowledge that the server that issued the token and the server
+the client is connecting to are jointly managing the tokens.
 

OK, then I have misunderstood this. Unless covered in neighbouring paragraphs I think this should be explained.

However, if the token is required to appear random and unique, why would there a privacy concern? Due to length, or because appear random is not a realistic requirement?

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