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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Preventing KEY_PHASE bit from being used as a tool to correlate CIDs (#1322)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Fri, 04 May 2018 01:23 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Preventing KEY_PHASE bit from being used as a tool to correlate CIDs (#1322)
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@marten-seemann 
> Is there any limit on how many key updates can safely be done? If not, another option would be to lower the threshold to e.g. 2^16 (this would correspond to roughly 80MB of data transferred). This would ensure that a significant fraction of QUIC connections would do a key update.

I would prefer setting the threshold to something greater than the largest delta that can be represented by the PN field of a QUIC packet. That property ensures you that having 2 generations of encryption keys is enough, regardless of how the client injects gaps. That is why I proposed 2<sup>32</sup>.

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