Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and integrity limits (#3788)
David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Wed, 15 July 2020 20:10 UTC
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Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 13:10:43 -0700
From: David Schinazi <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and integrity limits (#3788)
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IANAC (disclaimer: I Am Not A Cryptographer) >From my understanding of the issue, it seems that draft-29 does not provide the security guarantees it claims, when in the presence of a high number of received forged packets. In that instance, QUIC provides less security than TLS 1.3. I think that we should fix this issue in QUICv1, since we are chartered to produce a protocol that is at least as safe as TLS1.3. PR #3789 seems like the right direction to me, especially if folks more knowledgeable in cryptography think it's correct. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3788#issuecomment-658983102
- [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and inte… Christopher Wood
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and … Lars Eggert
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and … Christopher Wood
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and … David Schinazi
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and … Lucas Pardue
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] New confidentiality and … Martin Thomson