Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Mon, 31 August 2020 23:46 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 91F283A19DA for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:46:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.697
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.697 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RDfc9yYaAmpO for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:46:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-28.smtp.github.com (out-28.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.211]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD0D63A1096 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:46:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from github-lowworker-0f78100.ash1-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-0f78100.ash1-iad.github.net [10.56.25.48]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 136659001F3 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:46:07 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1598917567; bh=YeReF4QIYDcFveXn+q40wIQLQvx0VtRni6XueitsxlA=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=131tZyPdOQL89FiH31uFk6LNiyiTseM2YcHAw29ox9n4T+BIaEf4KCfWqcvQBeEkg bVM2EkZ5Jl6ZU0fTgMTCcnGzxs7OoaPkiz5YRLy8r7naswc45t0jon1fNDj/I29wFq Gih7xOhQxsHulfrJhL7gHsCccUFldHOiTjh6PGD4=
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 16:46:07 -0700
From: David Schinazi <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK6TPSP2UA7AUEHQLAV5LFWL7EVBNHHCQ3GPNU@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3996/review/479072756@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3996@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3996@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5f4d8bbf2ffa_40191964873c1"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: DavidSchinazi
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/KfjABxeqoo6nQOAdEt866jQDZPc>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 23:46:12 -0000

@DavidSchinazi commented on this pull request.



> +Services offered over loopback interfaces (that is, the IPv6 address ::1 or the
+IPv4 address 127.0.0.1) often lack proper authentication. Endpoints MAY prevent
+connection attempts or migration to a loopback address. Endpoints SHOULD NOT
+allow connections or migration to a loopback address if the same service was
+previously available at a different interface or if the address was provided by
+a service at a non-loopback address. Endpoints that depend on these
+capabilities could offer an option to disable these protections.
+
+Similarly, endpoints could regard a change in address to link-local address
+{{?RFC4291}} or an address in a private use range {{?RFC1918}} from a global,
+unique-local {{?RFC4193}}, or non-private address as a potential attempt at
+request forgery. Endpoints could refuse to use these addresses entirely, but
+that carries a significant risk of interfering with legitimate uses. Endpoints
+SHOULD NOT refuse to use an address unless they have specific knowledge about
+the network indicating that sending datagrams to unvalidated addresses in a
+given range is not safe.

Huh. I just reread the paragraph, and now it I agree with you that it mentions the issue and warns against reactionary solutions. I guess I must have misread it last time around, apologies.

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3996#discussion_r480476588