Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Wed, 08 May 2019 21:11 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)
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DavidSchinazi commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1086,25 +1097,44 @@ before the final TLS handshake messages are received.  A client will be unable
 to decrypt 1-RTT packets from the server, whereas a server will be able to
 decrypt 1-RTT packets from the client.
 
-However, a server MUST NOT process data from incoming 1-RTT protected packets
-before verifying either the client Finished message or - in the case that the
-server has chosen to use a pre-shared key - the pre-shared key binder (see
-Section 4.2.11 of {{!TLS13}}).  Verifying these values provides the server with
-an assurance that the ClientHello has not been modified.  Packets protected with
+Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the first
+handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on the state of the
+client:

Fixed

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