Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Ekr editorial 17 3 (#2164)

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

martinthomson commented on this pull request.

Thanks for these.  Nits only.

> @@ -1616,7 +1619,8 @@ Token field of its Initial packet.
 A token allows a server to correlate activity between the connection where the
 token was issued and any connection where it is used.  Clients that want to
 break continuity of identity with a server MAY discard tokens provided using the
-NEW_TOKEN frame.  Tokens obtained in Retry packets MUST NOT be discarded.
+NEW_TOKEN frame.  Tokens obtained in Retry packets MUST NOT be discarded
+during connection establishment (they will not be used with new connections).
 

What @mikkelfj said.

The parenthetical doesn't really make sense to me - it's true, but I don't see how it is connected to the primary statement.

> @@ -1679,9 +1683,10 @@ peer from a new local address.  In path validation, endpoints test reachability
 between a specific local address and a specific peer address, where an address
 is the two-tuple of IP address and port.
 
-Path validation tests that packets can be both sent to and received from a peer
-on the path.  Importantly, it validates that the packets received from the
-migrating endpoint do not carry a spoofed source address.
+Path validation tests that packets (PATH_CHALLENGE) can be both sent
+to and received (PATH_RESPONSE) from a peer on the path.  Importantly,

I agree, this likely confuses things more than it helps.

>  
-If a PATH_RESPONSE frame is received on a different local address than the one
-from which the PATH_CHALLENGE was sent, path validation is not considered to be
-successful, even if the data matches the PATH_CHALLENGE.  This doesn't result in
-path validation failure, as it might be a result of a forwarded packet (see
-{{off-path-forward}}) or misrouting.
+Note that receipt on a different local address doesn't result in path

@janaiyengar insists on avoiding contractions.

> @@ -2205,12 +2210,13 @@ An endpoint is not expected to handle key updates when it is closing or
 draining.  A key update might prevent the endpoint from moving from the closing
 state to draining, but it otherwise has no impact.
 
-An endpoint could receive packets from a new source address, indicating a client
-connection migration ({{migration}}), while in the closing period. An endpoint
-in the closing state MUST strictly limit the number of packets it sends to this
-new address until the address is validated (see {{migrate-validate}}). A server
-in the closing state MAY instead choose to discard packets received from a new
-source address.
+While in the closing period, an endpoint could receive packets from a
+new source address, indicating a client connection migration
+({{migration}}). An endpoint in the closing state MUST strictly limit
+the number of packets it sends to this new address until the address
+is validated (see {{migrate-validate}}). A server in the closing state
+MAY instead choose to discard packets received from a new source
+address.

The change to the fill-column is making this harder to review than I'd like.  I guess that's just a consequence of insisting on wrapping at <80...

> @@ -2294,7 +2301,7 @@ coalesced (see {{packet-coalesce}}) to facilitate retransmission.
 
 ## Stateless Reset {#stateless-reset}
 
-A stateless reset is provided as an option of last resort for an endpoint that
+A stateless reset is provided as an option of last resort for a server that

Yep :)

> @@ -2338,14 +2345,15 @@ of the packet header.  The remainder of the first byte and an arbitrary
 number of random bytes following it are set to unpredictable values.  The last
 16 bytes of the datagram contain a Stateless Reset Token.
 
-A stateless reset will be interpreted by a recipient as a packet with a short
-header.  For the packet to appear as valid, the Random Bits field needs to
-include at least 182 bits of random or unpredictable values (or 24 bytes, less
-the two fixed bits).  This is intended to allow for a destination connection ID
-of the maximum length permitted, with a minimal packet number, and payload.  The
-Stateless Reset Token corresponds to the minimum expansion of the packet
-protection AEAD.  More random bytes might be necessary if the endpoint could
-have negotiated a packet protection scheme with a larger minimum AEAD expansion.
+A stateless reset will be interpreted by a recipient as a packet with
+a short header.  For the packet to appear as valid, the Random Bits
+field needs to include at least 182 bits of data (or 24 bytes, less
+the two fixed bits). This is intended to allow for a destination
+connection ID of the maximum length permitted, with a minimal packet

This is a field, so the capitalization is correct.

> @@ -2447,9 +2455,11 @@ Note that Stateless Reset packets do not have any cryptographic protection.
 
 ### Looping {#reset-looping}
 
-The design of a Stateless Reset is such that it is indistinguishable from a
-valid packet.  This means that a Stateless Reset might trigger the sending of a
-Stateless Reset in response, which could lead to infinite exchanges.
+The design of a Stateless Reset is such that without knowing the
+stateless reset token it is indistinguishable from a valid packet.
+This means that if a server sends a Stateless Reset to another server,
+that might trigger the sending of a Stateless Reset in response, which

One fewer: "If a server sends a Stateless Reset to another server, it might receive another Stateless Reset in response."

> @@ -3732,9 +3743,9 @@ ID that is chosen by the recipient of the packet; the Source Connection ID
 includes the connection ID that the sender of the packet wishes to use (see
 {{negotiating-connection-ids}}).
 
-The first Handshake packet sent by a server contains a packet number of 0.
-Handshake packets are their own packet number space.  Packet numbers are
-incremented normally for other Handshake packets.
+

```suggestion
```

> @@ -3732,9 +3743,9 @@ ID that is chosen by the recipient of the packet; the Source Connection ID
 includes the connection ID that the sender of the packet wishes to use (see
 {{negotiating-connection-ids}}).
 
-The first Handshake packet sent by a server contains a packet number of 0.
-Handshake packets are their own packet number space.  Packet numbers are
-incremented normally for other Handshake packets.
+
+Handshake packets are their own packet number space, and thus
+the first Handshake packet sent by a server contains a packet number of 0.

I think that we're operating on the assumption that you start sending from 0, but there is no strict requirement because it's unenforceable.  Loss.

> @@ -3847,10 +3858,11 @@ MUST include the value of the Original Destination Connection ID field of the
 Retry packet (that is, the Destination Connection ID field from the client's
 first Initial packet) in the transport parameter.
 
-If the client received and processed a Retry packet, it validates that the
-original_connection_id transport parameter is present and correct; otherwise, it
-validates that the transport parameter is absent.  A client MUST treat a failed
-validation as a connection error of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
+If the client received and processed a Retry packet, it MUST validate
+that the original_connection_id transport parameter is present and
+correct; otherwise, it validates that the transport parameter is
+absent.  A client MUST treat a failed validation as a connection error
+of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.

I'm OK with the existing or as Mike suggests.

> @@ -5326,7 +5338,7 @@ An accompanying transport parameter registration (see
 specification needs to describe the format and assigned semantics of any fields
 in the frame.
 
-Expert(s) are encouraged to be biased towards approving registrations unless
+Expert(s) SHOULD be biased towards approving registrations unless

Not really an interoperability requirement.

```suggestion
Expert(s) are encouraged to be biased towards approving registrations unless
```

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2164#pullrequestreview-184970263