Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Backoff of CONNECTION_CLOSE needs to be a MUST (#3095)

Kazuho Oku <> Wed, 16 October 2019 15:10 UTC

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From: Kazuho Oku <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Backoff of CONNECTION_CLOSE needs to be a MUST (#3095)
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> Servers don't need to pad Initial packets and servers drop Initials less than 1200 bytes, so I believe the other 'Server' would drop the Initial CONNECTION_CLOSE and this would stop quickly.

Oh I missed that point. Thank you for pointing it out.

Though it is still possible to mount this attack by sending an invalid 0-RTT packet

Consider the case where an attacker obtains a session ticket from both servers beforehand, and sends datagrams to the servers, each consisting of Initial and 0-RTT packets (of which 0-RTT packet contains an invalid frame). Then, assuming that both servers accept 0-RTT, they would send to each other a series of Initial, Handshake, and 1-RTT packets, of which the 1-RTT packet would contain an CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.

So that would cause a ping-pong.

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