Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considerations (#3575)
Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Thu, 16 April 2020 20:27 UTC
Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 920D83A1007 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:27:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.267
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.267 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.168, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EhXT8JFBle72 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:27:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from out-3.smtp.github.com (out-3.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.194]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C95923A1006 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:27:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from github-lowworker-28f8021.ac4-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-28f8021.ac4-iad.github.net [10.52.25.98]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A1E4E2C1307 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:27:21 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1587068841; bh=tA5f1BTyR/h66K6n5CjlsHD4MwaBD5nVqRATE15gWBU=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=FRt34DI/Hh7G+U3bI5SMpJ9rsLDTdWbhfHifTOPlIxSblTj1/GPD2earWQR02HEGm aIFBr7XRcpnym4N85aaesomNT2W261959XkM3d13CFwj9R3Z9ufzNqeJ/cx3J8xcBi +KhZGNXyeTb3zxEqFF4o6gMf8F5EPnWrCyyCujAA=
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 13:27:21 -0700
From: Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK7YCC4XEGKBTPUMZ3N4USQKTEVBNHHCHNTZ2Y@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3575/review/394965096@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3575@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3575@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considerations (#3575)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5e98bfa99319c_26833f8ecf6cd96c37781e"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: MikeBishop
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/NspEaP0djRzzFLc-mIlSYddOXLA>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 20:27:25 -0000
@MikeBishop approved this pull request. All looks good (and familiar); some minor nits. > +used. If HPACK (see Section 6.2.3 of [RFC7541]) is used for re-encoding, the +never indexed literal representation MUST be used. ```suggestion used. If HPACK is used for re-encoding, the never indexed literal representation (see Section 6.2.3 of [RFC7541]) MUST be used. ``` > + +Implementations can also choose to protect sensitive header fields by not +compressing them and instead encoding their value as literals. + +Refusing to insert a header field into the dynamic table is only +effective if doing so is avoided on all hops. The never indexed literal bit (see +{{literal-name-reference}}) can be used to signal to intermediaries that a +particular value was intentionally sent as a literal. + +An intermediary MUST NOT re-encode a value that uses a literal representation +with the 'N' bit set with another representation that would index it. If QPACK +is used for re-encoding, a literal representation with the 'N' bit set MUST be +used. If HPACK (see Section 6.2.3 of [RFC7541]) is used for re-encoding, the +never indexed literal representation MUST be used. + +The choice to use a never indexed literal representation for a header field ```suggestion The choice to mark that a header field should never be indexed ``` > +the decoder through the setting parameter SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY and +SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS, respectively (see ```suggestion the decoder through the settings parameters SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY and SETTINGS_QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS, respectively (see ``` > + +## Static Huffman Encoding + +There is no currently known attack against a static Huffman encoding. A study +has shown that using a static Huffman encoding table created an information +leakage, however this same study concluded that an attacker could not take +advantage of this information leakage to recover any meaningful amount of +information (see [PETAL]). + +## Memory Consumption + +An attacker can try to cause an endpoint to exhaust its memory. QPACK is +designed to limit both the peak and stable amounts of memory allocated by an +endpoint. + +The amount of memory used by the compressor is limited by the protocol using ```suggestion The amount of memory used by the encoder is limited by the protocol using ``` > +SETTINGS_QPACK_MAX_TABLE_CAPACITY parameter. An encoder can limit the amount of +state memory it uses by signaling a lower dynamic table size than the decoder +allows (see {{eviction}}). + +A decoder can limit the amount of state memory used for blocked streams by +setting an appropriate value for the maximum number of blocked streams. In +HTTP/3, this is realized by setting an appropriate value for the +QPACK_BLOCKED_STREAMS parameter. An encoder can limit the amount of state +memory by only using as many blocked streams as it wishes to support; no +signaling to the decoder is requred. + +The amount of temporary memory consumed by an encoder or decoder can be limited +by processing header fields sequentially. A decoder implementation does not need +to retain a complete list of header fields while decoding a header block. An +encoder implementation does not need to retain a complete list of header fields +if while encoding a header block if it is using a single-pass encoder. Note ```suggestion while encoding a header block if it is using a single-pass algorithm. Note ``` > @@ -1155,6 +1369,19 @@ to an excess of unsent data might include limiting the ability of the peer to open new streams, reading only from the encoder stream, or closing the connection. + +## Implementation Limits + +An implementation of QPACK needs to ensure that large values for integers, long +encoding for integers, or long string literals do not create security +weaknesses. + +An implementation has to set a limit for the values it accepts for integers, as +well as for the encoded length (see {{prefixed-integers}}). In the same way, it +has to set a limit to the length it accepts for string literals (see +{{string-literals}}). I believe we have a minimum size which MUST be supported; should that be mentioned here? -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3575#pullrequestreview-394965096
- [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security consideration… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Lucas Pardue
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Lucas Pardue
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Mike Bishop
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Mike Bishop
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Bence Béky
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… Lucas Pardue
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] QPACK security considera… afrind