Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

Eric Kinnear <notifications@github.com> Sat, 16 November 2019 13:40 UTC

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Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2019 05:40:57 -0800
From: Eric Kinnear <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)
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erickinnear commented on this pull request.



> +the original packets it observes from reaching their intended destination.  If
+so, they are considered to be an on-path attacker.
+
+An active attacker may also choose to rewrite the source or destination IP
+addresses of packets that it forwards or injects. Such spoofing attacks are only
+effective against a QUIC connection if the attacker can still forward the
+contents of the packets to the original endpoint, since QUIC connections are
+both authenticated and encrypted.
+
+A blind attacker, one who injects packets without being able to observe valid
+packets for a QUIC connection, is unlikely to be successful, since QUIC packet
+protection ensures that valid packets are only generated by endpoints which
+possess the key material established during the handshake.  Similarly, any
+active attacker that observes QUIC packets and attempts to insert new data or
+modify existing data in those packets should not be able to generate packets
+deemed valid by the receiving endpoint.

Moved a bunch of this up into packet protection section

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