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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Spoofed retry token attack on IP
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> to add to the vulnerably section that a server SHOULD/MUST not grant privileged access based on the clients IP address verified by a Retry token since on-path devices and also path observing devices can race a Retry packet with a spoofed IP address.

I disagree, because a node that can receive packets going to address X and that can also send a packet that states to originate from X can initiate a new connection by itself.

For such a node, there is no need to piggyback on an Initial sent by the true owner of address X.

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<blockquote>
<p>to add to the vulnerably section that a server SHOULD/MUST not grant p=
rivileged access based on the clients IP address verified by a Retry toke=
n since on-path devices and also path observing devices can race a Retry =
packet with a spoofed IP address.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I disagree, because a node that can receive packets going to address X=
 and that can also send a packet that states to originate from X can init=
iate a new connection by itself.</p>
<p>For such a node, there is no need to piggyback on an Initial sent by t=
he true owner of address X.</p>

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