Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Import HTTP/2 Security Considerations (#3531)

Lucas Pardue <notifications@github.com> Thu, 19 March 2020 17:44 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Import HTTP/2 Security Considerations (#3531)
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LPardue commented on this pull request.



> +
+Caching responses that are pushed is possible based on the guidance provided by
+the origin server in the Cache-Control header field. However, this can cause
+issues if a single server hosts more than one tenant.  For example, a server
+might offer multiple users each a small portion of its URI space.
+
+Where multiple tenants share space on the same server, that server MUST ensure
+that tenants are not able to push representations of resources that they do not
+have authority over.  Failure to enforce this would allow a tenant to provide a
+representation that would be served out of cache, overriding the actual
+representation that the authoritative tenant provides.
+
+Pushed responses for which an origin server is not authoritative (see
+{{connection-reuse}}) MUST NOT be used or cached.
+
+## Denial-of-Service Considerations

Is it worth a link to the HTTP/2 DoS CVE(s) from 2019 as a practical demonstration?

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