Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticate connection IDs (#3499)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Tue, 12 May 2020 04:14 UTC

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Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 21:14:26 -0700
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticate connection IDs (#3499)
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@martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> +first Initial packet it sent in the initial_source_connection_id transport
+parameter; see {{transport-parameter-definitions}}. A server includes the
+Destination Connection ID field from the first Initial packet it received from
+the client in the original_destination_connection_id transport parameter; if
+the server sent a Retry packet this refers to the first Initial packet received
+before sending the Retry packet. If it sends a Retry packet, a server also
+includes the Source Connection ID field from the Retry packet in the
+retry_source_connection_id transport parameter.
+
+The values provided by a peer for these transport parameters MUST match the
+values that an endpoint used in the Destination and Source Connection ID fields
+of Initial packets that it sent. Including connection ID values in transport
+parameters and verifying them ensures that that an attacker cannot influence
+the choice of connection ID for a successful connection by injecting packets
+carrying attacker-chosen connection IDs during the handshake. An endpoint MUST
+treat any of the following as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION:

I like that rationale.  I could also see my way to choose TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.  We use that for transport parameters that are present when they are disallowed (like preferred_address from a client) in addition to obvious encoding problems, which suggests that you might implement this as `if transport_parameters.bad() then TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR`, but this validation does involve accessing external state, as you say, so a different code is fully justified.

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