[quicwg/base-drafts] What compromises do we take during the handshake (#645)
Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Tue, 20 June 2017 23:03 UTC
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Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2017 16:03:34 -0700
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] What compromises do we take during the handshake (#645)
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We need to decide what guarantees we will assume prior to establishing common keys. This touches on things like * whether we want to abort the connection in response to spoofed packets, or whether we can ignore them * how the client does source address validation for the server * whether the connection ID needs to be stable during the handshake or whether the 5-tuple is enough This covers #624, #594, #554, and likely other issues. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/645
- [quicwg/base-drafts] What compromises do we take … Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Handshake guarantees/com… Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Handshake guarantees/com… Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Handshake guarantees/com… Martin Thomson