Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

ekr <> Sat, 24 November 2018 04:34 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)
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ekr commented on this pull request.

> @@ -691,6 +692,24 @@ will be marked as lost before this, as they leave a gap in the sequence of
 packet numbers.
+## Discarding Initial Keys {#discard-initial}
+Packets protected with Initial secrets ({{initial-secrets}}) are not
+authenticated, meaning that an attacker could spoof packets with the intent to
+disrupt a connection.  To limit these attacks, Initial packet protection keys
+can be discarded more aggressively than other keys.
+The successful use of Handshake packets indicates that no more Initial packets
+need to be exchanged, as these keys can only be produced after receiving all
+CRYPTO frames from Initial packets.  Thus, a client MUST discard Initial keys
+when it first sends a Handshake packet and a server MUST discard Initial keys
+when it first successfully processes a Handshake packet.  Endpoints MUST NOT
+send Initial packets after this point.

Yes, and it's not clear to me it's worth making *this* change to defend against this attack. As I said, I don't recall there being consensus to make this change.

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