Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)

Eric Kinnear <> Sat, 16 November 2019 06:00 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1C6A11200B2 for <>; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 22:00:37 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.596
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.596 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key)
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ln8x_u_dt_sk for <>; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 22:00:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9EE3412022C for <>; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 22:00:35 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17B561210D4 for <>; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 22:00:35 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=pf2014; t=1573884035; bh=vL6NOyK/FbP6E8UF7mM1oCgy3HDXLCykVZeJItw3WXs=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=Jnp32TiNacppgAMxm3jxAkarRKOx5g9VEeqtW2D7T8zENP+48BsvtT3P9iXsf5VzB ABnYSZ9U2q2FWj47t6CH8aHwM2qW3SeO+k7GTFbBv/n8mOP5aske0I+H2s5scghbyA 4oRE04eOOR8k3y9+9oC3s8kK4mvOH8JBduJh7/zc=
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 22:00:34 -0800
From: Eric Kinnear <>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <>
Cc: Subscribed <>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2925/review/>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/pull/>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model to security considerations (#2925)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5dcf9082c7a8c_65af3f95078cd96862398c"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: erickinnear
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
Archived-At: <>
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2019 06:00:37 -0000

erickinnear commented on this pull request.

> +the original path between endpoints, and therefore the original packets sent by
+an endpoint are still reaching their destination.  This means that a future
+failure to route copied packets to the destination faster than their original
+path will not prevent the original packets from reaching the destination.
+A limited on-path attacker can:
+- Inspect packets
+- Inject new packets
+- Modify unencrypted packet headers
+A limited on-path attacker cannot:
+- Delay packets beyond the original packet duration
+- Drop packets
+- Modify encrypted packet payloads

Changed in bda13ed

You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: