Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] token-based greasing / initial packet protection (#3166)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Thu, 31 October 2019 00:01 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 17:01:36 -0700
From: Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] token-based greasing / initial packet protection (#3166)
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@DavidSchinazi Re downgrade prevention, I think we are converging on the same design (my design being the one that I had on this PR before dropping the downgrade).

Regarding the attack, I do not think we need to require the original token to be sent in a TP. Let me explain why:
* This PR requires the server that sends a Retry token to embed the the alternative sets of a NEW_TOKEN token in the Retry token (i.e. typically, NEW_TOKEN token found in an Initial packet that triggered the Retry would be embedded as-is in the Retry token).
* This PR used to require the client to continue sending the NEW_TOKEN token when downgrade happens. We can resurrect that requirement.

If we combine these two requirements, it would be possible for the server to detect a downgrade even if Retry was sent after downgrade, as the Retry token would convey the NEW_TOKEN token that the client originally submitted.

Re checksum, one way to solve this is to suggest servers advertising alternatives sets to embed a checksum to the tokens, using an key-less algorithm. For example, a server can build a NEW_TOKEN token as a combination of AES-CBC (encryption) and SHA256 (checksum).

Anyways, I think I might open a separate PR that describes the design with downgrade prevention, as having a PR would help us discuss the issues.

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