Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on key update (#2791)
Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Mon, 26 August 2019 22:37 UTC
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on key update (#2791)
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martinthomson commented on this pull request. > -what it is expecting. It creates a new secret (see Section 7.2 of {{!TLS13}}) -and the corresponding read key and IV using the KDF function provided by TLS. -The header protection key is not updated. - -If the packet can be decrypted and authenticated using the updated key and IV, -then the keys the endpoint uses for packet protection are also updated. The -next packet sent by the endpoint MUST then use the new keys. Once an endpoint -has sent a packet encrypted with a given key phase, it MUST NOT send a packet -encrypted with an older key phase. +While only one send key is used at a time, an endpoint MUST retain at least two +receive keys. + +Packets received with the current key phase are unprotected using the +corresponding receive key. When a packet arrives with the opposite key phase, +an endpoint determines which receive key to use by tracking the lowest packet +number among the packets received with the currently key phase. If a packet is ```suggestion number among the packets received with the current key phase. If a packet is ``` > + +Packets received with the current key phase are unprotected using the +corresponding receive key. When a packet arrives with the opposite key phase, +an endpoint determines which receive key to use by tracking the lowest packet +number among the packets received with the currently key phase. If a packet is +received that has a different KEY_PHASE bit and a lower packet number than this +value, the endpoint uses the receive key of the previous key phase for +unprotecting the packet, if that key is available. If the packet has a higher +packet number, the endpoint derives the receive key of the next key phase by +calculating the next secret (see Section 7.2 of {{!TLS13}}), the corresponding +read key and IV using the KDF function provided by TLS, unless the next receive +key has already been derived. The header protection key is not updated. + +Once derived, an endpoint retains the receive key of the next key phase, to +prevent attackers from targeting the calculation process of the next receive key +as an attack vector. An endpoint that retains only two receive keys drops the An attack on what? > +corresponding receive key. When a packet arrives with the opposite key phase, +an endpoint determines which receive key to use by tracking the lowest packet +number among the packets received with the currently key phase. If a packet is +received that has a different KEY_PHASE bit and a lower packet number than this +value, the endpoint uses the receive key of the previous key phase for +unprotecting the packet, if that key is available. If the packet has a higher +packet number, the endpoint derives the receive key of the next key phase by +calculating the next secret (see Section 7.2 of {{!TLS13}}), the corresponding +read key and IV using the KDF function provided by TLS, unless the next receive +key has already been derived. The header protection key is not updated. + +Once derived, an endpoint retains the receive key of the next key phase, to +prevent attackers from targeting the calculation process of the next receive key +as an attack vector. An endpoint that retains only two receive keys drops the +receive key of the previous key phase in favor of retaining the next receive +key. This has to happen *after* you successfully use the new key. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2791#pullrequestreview-279593687
- [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on key u… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Marten Seemann
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Nick Banks
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… David Schinazi
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… ianswett
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… MikkelFJ
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Marten Seemann
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Marten Seemann
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Marten Seemann
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… David Schinazi
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… David Schinazi
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… MikkelFJ
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… MikkelFJ
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… MikkelFJ
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… MikkelFJ
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… MikkelFJ
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… David Schinazi
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Kazuho Oku
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… David Schinazi
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Receiver's behavior on k… Martin Thomson