Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Thu, 09 May 2019 20:46 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)
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DavidSchinazi commented on this pull request.



> -an assurance that the ClientHello has not been modified.  Packets protected with
+Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the first
+handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on the client state:
+
+- The client is not authenticated, unless the server has chosen to use a
+pre-shared key and validated the client's pre-shared key binder; see
+Section 4.2.11 of {{!TLS13}}.
+- The client has not demonstrated liveness.
+- Any received 0-RTT data that the server responds to might be due to a replay
+attack.
+
+Therefore, the server's use of 1-RTT keys is limited before the handshake is
+complete.  A server MUST NOT process data from incoming 1-RTT
+protected packets before the TLS handshake is complete.  Because
+sending acknowledgments indicates that all frames in a packet have been
+processed, this means that a server cannot send acknowledgments for 1-RTT

Fixed

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