Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticate Retry (#1710)

[Nick Banks <[e-mail]>]

My primary goal with first suggesting the general design we have today with Retry was to support an **independent** DoS mitigation device to be put in path in front of the server. This is a requirement we get from Azure. If any changes to the Retry design require some state to be shared between the mitigation device (we own) and the backend QUIC server (we don't own), that will severely hamper the Azure efforts. It would require some deployment story and would make things a lot more complex for users and would likely go unused then.

You state above that unauthenticated Retry packets are a source of some concern, show that the initial CID can be modified and then go on to say it isn't a big deal (which I agree with). I'm still not really sure what folks are worried about this this supposed attack vector. Initial CID and Initial packet encryption are essentially just used for version ossification prevention. If the attacker understands the version, it's essentially cleartext.

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