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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Are random packet number skips still relevant for opportunistic ACK protection? (#1030)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Fri, 05 January 2018 08:22 UTC

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Date: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 08:21:59 +0000
From: MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Are random packet number skips still relevant for opportunistic ACK protection? (#1030)
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OK, I forgot part of the issue here. The connection ID protects against off path attacks.

The random gap protects against a malicious client or server that seeks to trick the peer into believing there is more bandwidth than what is available by ACK'ing too fast. This leads to congestion and denial of service of other peers, even without consuming any considerable resources at that attacked endpoint directly.

Could it work to include the spin bit in the ACK and thus get rid of random gaps?


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