Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow CONNECTION_CLOSE in 0-RTT (#3440)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Mon, 10 February 2020 03:06 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow CONNECTION_CLOSE in 0-RTT (#3440)
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kazuho commented on this pull request.



> @@ -328,8 +328,7 @@ encryption levels:
 
 - PADDING and PING frames MAY appear in packets of any encryption level.
 
-- CRYPTO frames and CONNECTION_CLOSE frames signaling errors at the QUIC layer
-  (type 0x1c) MAY appear in packets of any encryption level except 0-RTT.
+- CRYPTO frames MAY appear in packets of any encryption level except 0-RTT.
 
 - CONNECTION_CLOSE frames signaling application errors (type 0x1d) MUST only be
   sent in packets at the 1-RTT encryption level.

For consistency, should we strike this point to allow the use of application-level CONNECTION_CLOSE frames in 0-RTT? Looking at the changes proposed for the transport draft, I believe that that is the intent.

> @@ -328,8 +328,7 @@ encryption levels:
 
 - PADDING and PING frames MAY appear in packets of any encryption level.
 
-- CRYPTO frames and CONNECTION_CLOSE frames signaling errors at the QUIC layer
-  (type 0x1c) MAY appear in packets of any encryption level except 0-RTT.
+- CRYPTO frames MAY appear in packets of any encryption level except 0-RTT.

I am not sure if this change is correct, because this would mean that CONNECTION_CLOSE is allowed only in 0-RTT and 1-RTT levels.

I think what we need to do here is add CONNECTION_CLOSE (type 0x1c) to the point above that talks about PADDING and PING frames.

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