Return-Path: X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAF3212EB11 for ; Thu, 29 Nov 2018 17:54:52 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -9.46 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.46 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.46, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IWo9_EKhinJx for ; Thu, 29 Nov 2018 17:54:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from out-1.smtp.github.com (out-1.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.192]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E279512008A for ; Thu, 29 Nov 2018 17:54:50 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 17:54:49 -0800 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1543542889; bh=ajNb7nEGRo4e9hx/0mPXmWRc3c7OsHDeqpd9LHOyIeM=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=zdX7iwB/P7slm9FkqdtKaXzcxIvw7EezQEGQiXzg2vSXU2HyKPJ7CS+kBNdGK03KB dLtibEeJ4Fx8nxpM7MabEXyw14Cr7HVt/5Z/uqZyggCbPNik1FkxMuvN7B6g7UIT/E msBizl8vNzs/DpB8+BXzUG8tecsrJG2XZYLdS774= From: Kazuho Oku Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts To: quicwg/base-drafts Cc: Subscribed Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] allow dropping of Initial packets with invalid reserved bits (#2053) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5c009869dda97_4e2f3f80c76d45c025751e"; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: list X-GitHub-Sender: kazuho X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org Archived-At: X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 01:54:53 -0000 ----==_mimepart_5c009869dda97_4e2f3f80c76d45c025751e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit kazuho commented on this pull request. > @@ -3278,9 +3278,10 @@ Reserved Bits (R): : The next two bits (those with a mask of 0x0c) of byte 0 are reserved. These bits are protected using header protection (see Section 5.4 of {{QUIC-TLS}}). - The value included prior to protection MUST be set to 0. An endpoint MUST - treat receipt of a packet that has a non-zero value for these bits after - removing protection as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. + The value included prior to protection MUST be set to 0. For Handshake and + 0-RTT packets and endpoint MUST treat a non-zero value after removing + protection as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. For Initial + packets, and endpoint MAY instead choose to drop the packet. How about stating that, for Initial packets: * an endpoint MUST ignore CRYPTO frames once it obtains Handshake keys * an endpoint MUST ignore CONNECTION_CLOSE frames once it receives a Handshake packet * an endpoint MUST ignore unexpected packet numbers found in an ACK frame I think these three requirements are sufficient to address the attacks that happen _after_ 1 RTT. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2053#pullrequestreview-180095379 ----==_mimepart_5c009869dda97_4e2f3f80c76d45c025751e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

@kazuho commented on this pull request.

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

> @@ -3278,9 +3278,10 @@ Reserved Bits (R):
 
 : The next two bits (those with a mask of 0x0c) of byte 0 are reserved.  These
   bits are protected using header protection (see Section 5.4 of {{QUIC-TLS}}).
-  The value included prior to protection MUST be set to 0.  An endpoint MUST
-  treat receipt of a packet that has a non-zero value for these bits after
-  removing protection as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
+  The value included prior to protection MUST be set to 0.  For Handshake and
+  0-RTT packets and endpoint MUST treat a non-zero value after removing
+  protection as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. For Initial
+  packets, and endpoint MAY instead choose to drop the packet.

How about stating that, for Initial packets:

  • an endpoint MUST ignore CRYPTO frames once it obtains Handshake keys
  • an endpoint MUST ignore CONNECTION_CLOSE frames once it receives a Handshake packet
  • an endpoint MUST ignore unexpected packet numbers found in an ACK frame

I think these three requirements are sufficient to address the attacks that happen after 1 RTT.

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