Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

[Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>]

@MikeBishop commented on this pull request.



> +what packets the peer sends and where these packets are sent. If an attacker
+can target a vulnerable service with a controlled payload, that service might
+perform actions that are attributed to the attacker's peer, but decided by the
+attacker.
+
+For example, cross-site request forgery {{?CSRF=DOI.10.1145/1455770.1455782}}
+exploits on the Web cause a client to issue requests that include authorization
+cookies {{?COOKIE=RFC6265}}, allowing one site access to information and
+actions that are intended to be restricted to a different site.
+
+As QUIC runs over UDP, the primary attack modality of concern is one where an
+attacker can select the address to which its peer sends UDP datagrams and can
+control some of the unprotected content of those packets. As much of the data
+sent by QUIC endpoints is protected, this includes control over ciphertext. An
+attack is successful if an attacker can cause a peer to send a UDP datagram to
+a host that will perform some action based on content in the datagram.

The Message Send Service (RFC 1312) seems like a potential target.

>    This service is primarily intended for "open" environments:
>   controlled local area networks used by reasonably trusted
>   participants, in which security considerations may be relaxed in the
>   interests of ease of use and administration. In such an environment
>   it is appropriate to trust the user name and source IP address as
>   identifying the actual sender of the message.

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