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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Are random packet number skips still relevant for opportunistic ACK protection? (#1030)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Thu, 04 January 2018 23:23 UTC

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Date: Thu, 04 Jan 2018 23:23:16 +0000
From: MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Are random packet number skips still relevant for opportunistic ACK protection? (#1030)
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If the ACK is contained in a packet encrypted with the connection ID, the attacker must known the connection ID or guess 1/2^64. So effectively the attacker is able to listen to the transmission. How would path verification improve on this before the handshake is complete if the attacker can observe traffic and spoof the source?

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