Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add initial threat model appendix (#2925)

[Eric Kinnear <[e-mail]>]

erickinnear commented on this pull request.



> +- Delay packets
+- Drop packets
+
+An off-path attacker can, however, modify packets that it has observed and
+inject them back into the network, potentially with spoofed source and
+destination addresses.
+
+For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that an off-path attacker has the
+ability to observe, modify, and re-inject a packet into the network that will
+reach the destination endpoint prior to the arrival of the original packet
+observed by the attacker.  In other words, the attacker has the ability to
+consistently "win" a race with the legitimate packets between the endpoints,
+potentially causing the original packet to be ignored by the recipient.
+
+We also assume that the attacker has the resources necessary to affect NAT
+state, potentially both causing an endpoint to lose its NAT binding, and an

I've changed some "the attacker" to "an attacker" to be more specific, we've got "an" for endpoint everywhere except one place where it's a packet between "the endpoints" that are having a conversation. 

There's a few places where we say something along the lines of 
> 2. An on-path attacker can prevent migration to a new path for which the
> attacker is also on-path by causing path validation to fail on the new path.

Which is a case where we use both "an" and "the", but otherwise it's all the same now. (And suggestions welcome for those cases, it started to sound very wrong when I switched those around.)

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