Return-Path: X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72E5E12001E for ; Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:31:26 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -8 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fc9AithhxcJv for ; Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:31:24 -0700 (PDT) Received: from out-22.smtp.github.com (out-22.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.205]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 73CCA12014B for ; Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:31:24 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2019 13:31:23 -0700 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1563654683; bh=Exw5GKkehBRou0U5ffIrzUEz4VJUnikZ1KXYkmN7SII=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=TL4c+9FGoWKlCw9T9sGWp28DTeJ2dnoptXwLdyFKoPUR4T3oDA7bBikuGpVoxENnG ribqCx4FDsIfzjcSyPzHtKovAtlIuzA3AT9591vKskQGBIqSkwDFLFN3FUvWEyPD0D IoCgzIVNMyH0CaxWO/6dgTIQBraKAn59xAE4zscc= From: ianswett Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts To: quicwg/base-drafts Cc: Subscribed Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Remove DoS vector for spoofed connection migration (#2893) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5d337a1b850b9_17483f9442ccd95c1756019"; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: list X-GitHub-Sender: ianswett X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org Archived-At: X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2019 20:31:27 -0000 ----==_mimepart_5d337a1b850b9_17483f9442ccd95c1756019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit ianswett approved this pull request. One editorial suggestion > -INVALID_MIGRATION. Similarly, an endpoint MUST NOT initiate migration if its -peer supplies a zero-length connection ID as packets without a Destination -Connection ID cannot be attributed to a connection based on address tuple. - -Not all changes of peer address are intentional migrations. The peer could -experience NAT rebinding: a change of address due to a middlebox, usually a NAT, -allocating a new outgoing port or even a new outgoing IP address for a flow. An -endpoint MUST perform path validation ({{migrate-validate}}) if it detects any -change to a peer's address, unless it has previously validated that address. +An endpoint also MUST NOT send packets from a different local address, actively +initiating migration, if the peer sent the `disable_active_migration` transport +parameter during the handshake. An endpoint which has sent this transport +parameter, but detects that a peer has nonetheless migrated to a different +network MUST either drop the incoming packets on that path without generating a +stateless reset or proceed with path validation and allow the peer to migrate. +This helps to prevent third parties in the network causing connections to close This = Not generating a stateless reset? If so, how about "Generating a stateless reset would allow third parties in the network to cause a connection to close by spoofing or other manipulation of observed traffic."? -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/2893#pullrequestreview-264510290 ----==_mimepart_5d337a1b850b9_17483f9442ccd95c1756019 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

@ianswett approved this pull request.

One editorial suggestion

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

> -INVALID_MIGRATION.  Similarly, an endpoint MUST NOT initiate migration if its
-peer supplies a zero-length connection ID as packets without a Destination
-Connection ID cannot be attributed to a connection based on address tuple.
-
-Not all changes of peer address are intentional migrations. The peer could
-experience NAT rebinding: a change of address due to a middlebox, usually a NAT,
-allocating a new outgoing port or even a new outgoing IP address for a flow.  An
-endpoint MUST perform path validation ({{migrate-validate}}) if it detects any
-change to a peer's address, unless it has previously validated that address.
+An endpoint also MUST NOT send packets from a different local address, actively
+initiating migration, if the peer sent the `disable_active_migration` transport
+parameter during the handshake. An endpoint which has sent this transport
+parameter, but detects that a peer has nonetheless migrated to a different
+network MUST either drop the incoming packets on that path without generating a
+stateless reset or proceed with path validation and allow the peer to migrate.
+This helps to prevent third parties in the network causing connections to close

This = Not generating a stateless reset? If so, how about "Generating a stateless reset would allow third parties in the network to cause a connection to close by spoofing or other manipulation of observed traffic."?

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