Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

[Mike Bishop <[e-mail]>]

@MikeBishop commented on this pull request.



> +the data sent by QUIC endpoints is protected, this includes control over
+ciphertext. An attack is successful if an attacker can cause a peer to send a

@janaiyengar, I agree with you that full control seems a little far-fetched, but depending on the protocol and the scenario, partial control seems really plausible.  At the most basic, consider an echo service over QUIC; you have complete control over the contents of the STREAM frames the peer sends, and if you know the peer's implementation, the packet formation is likely predictable as well unless they deliberately randomize it.  Couple that with victims who will skip junk bytes....

I think Martin's correct that, while no attacker will actually have 100% control over the ciphertext, which parts they do control will be difficult to guarantee.  So we have to evaluate the attack as if they have control over all of it.

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