Return-Path: X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 72F9E120033 for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 05:35:54 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -8 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cy55myR7ojf3 for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 05:35:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from out-5.smtp.github.com (out-5.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.196]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A91612002E for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 05:35:52 -0800 (PST) Received: from github-lowworker-fb56993.ac4-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-fb56993.ac4-iad.github.net [10.52.19.31]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8AFC196057E for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 05:35:51 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1573565751; bh=q6VSGD+NuSvtSocp8rm4KmB86WLcbjIlJQAtQfgwqCU=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=QtLT9r+++kwU0P8lodFSVph4qfy7HehlXMqvVFdxF4XOnasiJQZDqJAViGrFBJrAw wU623K2+8FDbydJ3xhftQjBHrNj4XIO3aydtYKeMl1IFbDR9Rb+ANjRKCyEG3TKKyW cCj3G5eTcCnu0PFKLux+SNfN61Claerx+6hsCq+Y= Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 05:35:51 -0800 From: MikkelFJ Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts To: quicwg/base-drafts Cc: Subscribed Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] A day in the life (#3225) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5dcab5377b908_62fa3fe552acd95c22964e1"; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: list X-GitHub-Sender: mikkelfj X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org Archived-At: X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:35:55 -0000 ----==_mimepart_5dcab5377b908_62fa3fe552acd95c22964e1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit mikkelfj commented on this pull request. Perhaps also some discussion on termination - silent idle timeout vs connection close, and risk of loss of close packet. > -required here. - -suggested structure: - - - establishment - - VN - - Retry - - Crypto - - use (include migration) - - shutdown - ---> +A QUIC connection is a stateful interaction between a client and server, the +primary purpose of which is to support the exchange of data by an application +protocol. Streams ({{streams}}) are the primary means by which an application +protocol exchanges information. That is not necessarily the case with DATAGRAM extension. > - - VN - - Retry - - Crypto - - use (include migration) - - shutdown - ---> +A QUIC connection is a stateful interaction between a client and server, the +primary purpose of which is to support the exchange of data by an application +protocol. Streams ({{streams}}) are the primary means by which an application +protocol exchanges information. + +Each connection starts with a handshake phase, during which client and server +establish a shared secret using the cryptographic handshake protocol +{{QUIC-TLS}} and negotiate the application protocol. The handshake +({{handshake}}) confirms that endpoints are willing to communicate ```suggestion ({{handshake}}) confirms that both endpoints are willing to communicate ``` > +Each connection starts with a handshake phase, during which client and server +establish a shared secret using the cryptographic handshake protocol +{{QUIC-TLS}} and negotiate the application protocol. The handshake +({{handshake}}) confirms that endpoints are willing to communicate +({{validate-handshake}}) and establishes parameters for the connection +({{transport-parameters}}). + +An application protocol can also operate in a limited fashion during the +handshake phase. 0-RTT allows application messages to be sent by a client +before receiving any messages from the server. However, 0-RTT lacks certain key +security guarantees. In particular, there is no protection against replay +attacks in 0-RTT; see {{QUIC-TLS}}. Separately, a server can also send +application data to a client before it receives the final cryptographic +handshake messages that allow it to confirm the identity and liveness of the +client. These capabilities allow an application protocol to offer the option to +trade some security guarantees for improved latency. ```suggestion trade some security guarantees for reduced latency. ``` ... or to buffer packets until the handshake is confirmed. > +({{transport-parameters}}). + +An application protocol can also operate in a limited fashion during the +handshake phase. 0-RTT allows application messages to be sent by a client +before receiving any messages from the server. However, 0-RTT lacks certain key +security guarantees. In particular, there is no protection against replay +attacks in 0-RTT; see {{QUIC-TLS}}. Separately, a server can also send +application data to a client before it receives the final cryptographic +handshake messages that allow it to confirm the identity and liveness of the +client. These capabilities allow an application protocol to offer the option to +trade some security guarantees for improved latency. + +The use of connection IDs ({{connection-id}}) allows connections to migrate to a +new network path, both as a direct choice of an endpoint and when forced by a +change in a middlebox. {{migration}} describes how a migration can be performed +securely without adversely affecting privacy. That is a strong claim. "... with as little impact on privacy as practically possible" would be more precise. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3225#pullrequestreview-315530990 ----==_mimepart_5dcab5377b908_62fa3fe552acd95c22964e1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

@mikkelfj commented on this pull request.

=0D =0D

Perhaps also some discussion on termination - silent idle timeout vs c= onnection close, and risk of loss of close packet.

=0D =0D

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> -required here.=0D
-=0D
-suggested structure:=0D
-=0D
- - establishment=0D
-   - VN=0D
-   - Retry=0D
-   - Crypto=0D
- - use (include migration)=0D
- - shutdown=0D
-=0D
--->=0D
+A QUIC connection is a stateful interaction between a client and server,=
 the=0D
+primary purpose of which is to support the exchange of data by an applic=
ation=0D
+protocol.  Streams ({{streams}}) are the primary means by which an appli=
cation=0D
+protocol exchanges information.=0D
=0D

That is not necessarily the case with DATAGRAM extension.

=0D =0D
=0D =0D

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> -   - VN=0D
-   - Retry=0D
-   - Crypto=0D
- - use (include migration)=0D
- - shutdown=0D
-=0D
--->=0D
+A QUIC connection is a stateful interaction between a client and server,=
 the=0D
+primary purpose of which is to support the exchange of data by an applic=
ation=0D
+protocol.  Streams ({{streams}}) are the primary means by which an appli=
cation=0D
+protocol exchanges information.=0D
+=0D
+Each connection starts with a handshake phase, during which client and s=
erver=0D
+establish a shared secret using the cryptographic handshake protocol=0D
+{{QUIC-TLS}} and negotiate the application protocol.  The handshake=0D
+({{handshake}}) confirms that endpoints are willing to communicate=0D
=0D =E2=AC=87=EF=B8=8F Suggested change=0D 
-({{handshake}}) confirms that endpoints are w=
illing to communicate=0D
+({{handshake}}) confirms that both endpoints are willing to communicate=0D=
=0D =0D =0D
=0D =0D

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> +Each connection starts with a handshake p=
hase, during which client and server=0D
+establish a shared secret using the cryptographic handshake protocol=0D
+{{QUIC-TLS}} and negotiate the application protocol.  The handshake=0D
+({{handshake}}) confirms that endpoints are willing to communicate=0D
+({{validate-handshake}}) and establishes parameters for the connection=0D=

+({{transport-parameters}}).=0D
+=0D
+An application protocol can also operate in a limited fashion during the=
=0D
+handshake phase.  0-RTT allows application messages to be sent by a clie=
nt=0D
+before receiving any messages from the server.  However, 0-RTT lacks cer=
tain key=0D
+security guarantees. In particular, there is no protection against repla=
y=0D
+attacks in 0-RTT; see {{QUIC-TLS}}.  Separately, a server can also send=0D=

+application data to a client before it receives the final cryptographic=0D=

+handshake messages that allow it to confirm the identity and liveness of=
 the=0D
+client.  These capabilities allow an application protocol to offer the o=
ption to=0D
+trade some security guarantees for improved latency.=0D
=0D =E2=AC=87=EF=B8=8F Suggested change=0D 
-trade some security guarantees for improved l=
atency.=0D
+trade some security guarantees for reduced latency.=0D
=0D =0D

... or to buffer packets until the handshake is confirmed.

=0D =0D
=0D =0D

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

=0D 
> +({{transport-parameters}}).=0D
+=0D
+An application protocol can also operate in a limited fashion during the=
=0D
+handshake phase.  0-RTT allows application messages to be sent by a clie=
nt=0D
+before receiving any messages from the server.  However, 0-RTT lacks cer=
tain key=0D
+security guarantees. In particular, there is no protection against repla=
y=0D
+attacks in 0-RTT; see {{QUIC-TLS}}.  Separately, a server can also send=0D=

+application data to a client before it receives the final cryptographic=0D=

+handshake messages that allow it to confirm the identity and liveness of=
 the=0D
+client.  These capabilities allow an application protocol to offer the o=
ption to=0D
+trade some security guarantees for improved latency.=0D
+=0D
+The use of connection IDs ({{connection-id}}) allows connections to migr=
ate to a=0D
+new network path, both as a direct choice of an endpoint and when forced=
 by a=0D
+change in a middlebox.  {{migration}} describes how a migration can be p=
erformed=0D
+securely without adversely affecting privacy.=0D
=0D

That is a strong claim. "... with as little impact on privacy as pract= ically possible" would be more precise.

=0D =0D

&m= dash;
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thre= ad.
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub, or unsubscribe= .3D""<= /p>=0D = ----==_mimepart_5dcab5377b908_62fa3fe552acd95c22964e1--