Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)

[David Schinazi <[e-mail]>]

DavidSchinazi commented on this pull request.



> @@ -724,6 +703,35 @@ This results in abandoning loss recovery state for the Initial encryption level
 and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
 
 
+### Discarding Handshake Keys
+
+An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
+confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
+keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most application protocols
+will send data after the handshake, generating acknowledgements and ensuring
+that both endpoints can discard their handshake keys promptly.  Endpoints that
+do not have reason to send immediately after completing the handshake MAY send
+ack-eliciting frames, such as PING, which will cause the handshake to be
+confirmed when they are acknowledged.
+
+
+### Discarding 0-RTT Keys
+
+Clients SHOULD discard 0-RTT keys as soon as they install 1-RTT keys, since

Fixed

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