Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] TLS alert no_application_protocol is not always possible (#3580)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Fri, 17 April 2020 03:28 UTC

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Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 20:28:33 -0700
From: Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] TLS alert no_application_protocol is not always possible (#3580)
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@martinthomson 
> I hope that the application isn't the callback code, but that quicly is involved in this somehow; otherwise, you have just made H2O responsible for fulfilling QUIC requirements that you might assume quicly would be responsible for.

Yeah I think my preference goes to not having an abstraction layer in our QUIC protocol stack for hiding TLS handshake protocol API. I'd argue that the intent of using TLS in QUIC is to reuse TLS including its extensions when possible. Requiring (or recommending) a QUIC stack to provide abstraction for those extensions (that happen at the handshake protocol level) reduces that benefit.

That said, I think we agree that in this particular case a generic alert is fine, and that what we need at most is an editorial improvement.

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