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[quicwg/base-drafts] SNI encryption (#795)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Mon, 25 September 2017 23:45 UTC

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Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 23:45:39 +0000
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] SNI encryption (#795)
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In #794, @hardie observed that the current draft for SNI encryption proposes solutions that are - at best - a poor fit for the current QUIC design.  Do we want to address this problem in the design?

Fixing the problem early might avoid foreclosing on potential solutions in the future.  It's also possible that we could take advantage of the fact that we don't really have a whole bunch of deployment assumptions that we have to work around.

On the other hand, it might also be really, really hard.  It's not like we haven't already tried to find a solution for TLS over TCP.

FWIW, I don't think that we get to resolve #794 until we have at least had a discussion about this issue.

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