Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Handling of corrupt Retry packets (#3014)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Tue, 17 September 2019 02:09 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 19:09:10 -0700
From: Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Handling of corrupt Retry packets (#3014)
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Jon Stone's work [[1](http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2000/conf/paper/sigcomm2000-9-1.pdf)] showed that the internet is actually quite terrible and that the TCP/UDP checksums are super important. From the conclusion section: "Our trace data shows that the TCP and UDP checksums are catching a signicant number of persistent errors. In practice, the checksum is being asked to detect an error every few thousand packets." Of course, this data is dated, but given the  I wouldn't be surprised if the numbers today were not too far off from the ones he reports.

@kazuho's right that we cannot rely on the UDP checksum being on in all circumstances, but I would guess that it'll be on in _most_ deployments. That said, the failure rate can be high enough to be bothersome in specific deployments. I would argue that it's a valuable goal to ensure that QUIC is protected against trivial corruption in all deployments.

I agree with @RyanAtGoogle that encrypting this packet is aligned with how we do things anyways, and there's additional benefit in being able to remove the ODCID. It is a bit late in the process, but this is a fairly isolated and local change.

I would argue that unless there's a strong reason to _not_ encrypt this packet, we should encrypt it. 

1: http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2000/conf/paper/sigcomm2000-9-1.pdf

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