Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

[ekr <[e-mail]>]

@ekr commented on this pull request.



> +A client MUST NOT send non-probing frames to a preferred address prior to
+validating that address; see {{address-validation}}. This greatly reduces the
+options that a server has to control the encrypted portion of datagrams.
+
+This document does not offer any additional countermeasures that are specific
+to use of preferred addresses and can be implemented by endpoints. The generic
+measures described in {{forgery-generic}} could be used as further mitigation.
+
+
+### Request Forgery with Spoofed Migration
+
+Clients are able to present a spoofed source address as part of an apparent
+connection migration to cause a server to send datagrams to that address.
+
+The Destination Connection ID field in any packets that a server subsequently
+sends to this spoofed address can be used for request forgery.

While the above is contrived, the server *does* have control of some things. For instance, I can control some of the content of GETs or ACKs.

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