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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Stateless Reset Eternal Ping Pong (#1443)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Wed, 20 June 2018 18:01 UTC

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From: Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Stateless Reset Eternal Ping Pong (#1443)
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I think the "compatible CID formats" piece of this doesn't matter.  The recipient of a short header packet won't be able to identify the CID because the length is unknown.  It will guess the length it probably used (assuming the remainder is payload) and generate a Stateless Reset with a random CID/body.

But yes, in the absence of loss, this will continue forever.  An attacker could start the process with a spoofed source address.  Perhaps a suggestion that endpoints SHOULD limit the number of Stateless Resets they will send to a given address?  If each side sends back even one fewer SR than it received incoming packets, the attacker doesn't get much return from its spoofed traffic.

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