Return-Path: X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 045271208D0 for ; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 02:23:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -7.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_32=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iAm-U3nnwX6O for ; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 02:23:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from out-23.smtp.github.com (out-23.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.206]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A309F1208A9 for ; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 02:23:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from github-lowworker-ca5950c.va3-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-ca5950c.va3-iad.github.net [10.48.17.57]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C6D77660919 for ; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 02:23:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1572513789; bh=E7eFqpDpuDC48jp3X6NeJc1cvvQdBLiurlVceorqBV0=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=zdb0iklj3dAnpcvboR06bUAK2KYWP/7idGvBLFi/rKzqVj6hTLkjwK8UIofyTQrDa YWgOhtftXurUpOFY98bw2UcVUjTKXiJ/KbCwWne+cyTquG+tnu81UJ0eGBJOdczCQz OruyeoCyssV9weJlr943X/5JCkYI6RE+pDxJsDGc= Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 02:23:09 -0700 From: Kazuho Oku Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts To: quicwg/base-drafts Cc: Subscribed Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] clarify the scope of a NEW_TOKEN token (#3156) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5dbaa7fdb86d8_48493fd8cc4cd96812753d5"; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: list X-GitHub-Sender: kazuho X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org Archived-At: X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 09:23:19 -0000 ----==_mimepart_5dbaa7fdb86d8_48493fd8cc4cd96812753d5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit kazuho commented on this pull request. > @@ -1698,10 +1698,13 @@ encrypted form in the token. It is unlikely that the client port number is the same on two different connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to be successful. -If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous connection -to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD include that value in the -Token field of its Initial packet. Including a token might allow the server to -validate the client address without an additional round trip. +A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable to any server that the +connection is considered authoritative for (e.g., server names included in the +certificate). When connecting to a server for which the client retains an +applicable and unused token, it SHOULD include that token in the Token field of +its Initial packet. Including a token might allow the server to validate the +client address without an additional round trip. A client MUST NOT include a +token that is not applicable to the server that it is connecting to. We have a normative text below, suggesting that says: _if the token is invalid then the server SHOULD proceed as if the client did not have a validated address, including potentially sending a Retry._ -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3156#discussion_r341029110 ----==_mimepart_5dbaa7fdb86d8_48493fd8cc4cd96812753d5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

@kazuho commented on this pull request.

In draft-ietf-quic-transport.md:

> @@ -1698,10 +1698,13 @@ encrypted form in the token.
 It is unlikely that the client port number is the same on two different
 connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to be successful.
 
-If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous connection
-to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD include that value in the
-Token field of its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to
-validate the client address without an additional round trip.
+A token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame is applicable to any server that the
+connection is considered authoritative for (e.g., server names included in the
+certificate).  When connecting to a server for which the client retains an
+applicable and unused token, it SHOULD include that token in the Token field of
+its Initial packet.  Including a token might allow the server to validate the
+client address without an additional round trip.  A client MUST NOT include a
+token that is not applicable to the server that it is connecting to.

We have a normative text below, suggesting that says: if the token is invalid then the server SHOULD proceed as if the client did not have a validated address, including potentially sending a Retry.

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