Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Peers that only terminate a single connection on an IP/port cannot migrate with 0-byte CIDs (#2441)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Fri, 15 February 2019 19:13 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Peers that only terminate a single connection on an IP/port cannot migrate with 0-byte CIDs (#2441)
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If a connection receives a garbage packet, it can be easily rejected based on the CID.  Only someone on-path will be able to observe the CID in use, so only on-path attackers can make you attempt to decrypt garbage.

If you use a zero-length CID, your CID is very easy to guess. 🙂 The restriction on migrating means that an attacker must spoof the remote port and IP in order to perform this attack, which means being on-path, which brings zero-length connection IDs up to equivalent security.

If we make this change, anyone can make you attempt to decrypt garbage packets.  Are we sure we want that?

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