Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow most frames in 0-RTT (#2355)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Sat, 09 March 2019 00:28 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow most frames in 0-RTT (#2355)
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MikeBishop commented on this pull request.



> -Servers MUST ensure that they account for any increase in costs before accepting
-connections or 0-RTT.
+QUIC is not vulnerable to replay attack, except via the application protocol
+information it might carry.  The management of QUIC protocol state based on the
+frame types defined in {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}} is not vulnerable to replay.
+Processing of QUIC frames is idempotent and cannot result in invalid connection
+states if frames are replayed, reordered or lost.  QUIC connections do not
+produce effects that last beyond the lifetime of the connection, except for
+those produced by the application protocol that QUIC serves.
+
+Note:
+
+: TLS session tickets and address validation tokens are used to carry QUIC
+  configuration information between connections.  These MUST NOT be used to
+  carry application state.  The potential for reuse of these tokens means that
+  they require stronger protections against replay.

This contradicts the advice about using session tickets to validate HTTP settings for 0-RTT.

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