Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Minor TLS draft editorial corrections (#2446)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Mon, 11 February 2019 00:32 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Minor TLS draft editorial corrections (#2446)
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martinthomson requested changes on this pull request.



> @@ -269,7 +271,7 @@ At a high level, there are two main interactions between the TLS and QUIC
 components:
 
 * The TLS component sends and receives messages via the QUIC component, with
-  QUIC providing a reliable stream abstraction to TLS.
+  QUIC providing a reliable stream and record abstraction to TLS.
 

The separation of CRYPTO into different spaces doesn't really result in a record-like abstraction.

>                       1-RTT --------------->
                                               Handshake Received
                                           Rekey rx to 1-RTT keys
-                                                   Get Handshake

This bit (and the next) need to remain for NewSessionTicket.

Do you think that it would help to identify which TLS messages are being sent and received here?

> @@ -216,10 +216,12 @@ Note that this omits the EndOfEarlyData message, which is not used in QUIC (see
 
 Data is protected using a number of encryption levels:
 
-- Plaintext
-- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys
-- Handshake Keys
-- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys
+- Initial Keys can be derived by any observer, and so they do not
+  provide cryptographic protection or authentication.
+- Early Data (0-RTT) Keys. These keys are not forward-secure and must protect
+  only idempotent data.
+- Handshake Keys do not authenticate either endpoint.
+- Application Data (1-RTT) Keys provide full authentication and encryption.
 

I tend to agree with @mikkelfj here.  The short names are easier to get at without the extra text.

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