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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Forgery limits on packet protection (#3619)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Fri, 01 May 2020 21:58 UTC

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Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 14:58:01 -0700
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Forgery limits on packet protection (#3619)
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(Tentative) good news on CCM: Kenny identified a security analysis paper and it seems relatively simple to go from that to numbers.

I am not personally concerned about support for key update. 9/15 isn't 15, but that doesn't bother me. It turns out to be a little fiddly to implement, so if people decide to drop connections that hit these limits instead, the effect isn't that bad. Of course, if you want to follow Nick's suggestion, that works too (I remember Dan Bernstein seriously suggesting a cipher that updated every record, back when I first proposed this scheme for TLS).

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