Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

[MikkelFJ <[e-mail]>]

mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -691,6 +692,24 @@ will be marked as lost before this, as they leave a gap in the sequence of
 packet numbers.
 
 
+## Discarding Initial Keys {#discard-initial}
+
+Packets protected with Initial secrets ({{initial-secrets}}) are not
+authenticated, meaning that an attacker could spoof packets with the intent to
+disrupt a connection.  To limit these attacks, Initial packet protection keys
+can be discarded more aggressively than other keys.
+
+The successful use of Handshake packets indicates that no more Initial packets
+need to be exchanged, as these keys can only be produced after receiving all
+CRYPTO frames from Initial packets.  Thus, a client MUST discard Initial keys
+when it first sends a Handshake packet and a server MUST discard Initial keys
+when it first successfully processes a Handshake packet.  Endpoints MUST NOT
+send Initial packets after this point.

Just for the perspective, attackers with observation powers are very very real. Aside from intelligence service taps, there is also infiltration. Even if you don't control the path, you migt sit on the same LAN because another machine was easier to infect.

This is a good read: https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/

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