Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Merge crypto timeout into PTO (#2655)

Jana Iyengar <notifications@github.com> Sat, 11 May 2019 01:01 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Merge crypto timeout into PTO (#2655)
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janaiyengar commented on this pull request.

Sorry about the number of comments. This is unfortunate because most of the text is just moving about. My suggestion still stands -- merge this and we can fix the pending issues in subsequent PRs (which I'm happy to work on immediately after this lands).

> @@ -687,6 +620,69 @@ be acknowledged or declared lost.  Initial secrets however might be destroyed
 sooner, as soon as handshake keys are available (see Section 4.10 of
 {{QUIC-TLS}}).
 
+## PTO for Crypto Packets
+
+The initial PTO SHOULD be set to twice the initial RTT or 1 second if no
+initial RTT is available as recommended in {{?RFC6298}}.
+
+Until the server has validated the client's address on the path, the amount of
+data it can send is limited, as specified in Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
+If not all unacknowledged CRYPTO data can be sent, then all unacknowledged
+CRYPTO data sent in Initial packets should be retransmitted.  If no data can be
+sent, then no alarm should be armed until data has been received from the

```suggestion
sent, then no alarm is needed for loss detection or recovery until data has been received from the
```

> @@ -1217,12 +1213,6 @@ SetLossDetectionTimer():
       time_of_last_sent_crypto_packet + timeout)
     return
 
-  // Don't arm timer if there are no ack-eliciting packets
-  // in flight.
-  if (no ack-eliciting packets in flight):
-    loss_detection_timer.cancel()
-    return
-

Revert this change. Why does this check need to be removed?

> @@ -687,6 +620,69 @@ be acknowledged or declared lost.  Initial secrets however might be destroyed
 sooner, as soon as handshake keys are available (see Section 4.10 of
 {{QUIC-TLS}}).
 
+## PTO for Crypto Packets
+
+The initial PTO SHOULD be set to twice the initial RTT or 1 second if no
+initial RTT is available as recommended in {{?RFC6298}}.
+
+Until the server has validated the client's address on the path, the amount of
+data it can send is limited, as specified in Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
+If not all unacknowledged CRYPTO data can be sent, then all unacknowledged
+CRYPTO data sent in Initial packets should be retransmitted.  If no data can be
+sent, then no alarm should be armed until data has been received from the
+client.
+
+Because the server could be blocked until more packets are received, the client
+MUST ensure that the crypto retransmission timer is set if there is

```suggestion
MUST ensure that the PTO timer is set if there is
```

> +## PTO for Crypto Packets
+
+The initial PTO SHOULD be set to twice the initial RTT or 1 second if no
+initial RTT is available as recommended in {{?RFC6298}}.
+
+Until the server has validated the client's address on the path, the amount of
+data it can send is limited, as specified in Section 8.1 of {{QUIC-TRANSPORT}}.
+If not all unacknowledged CRYPTO data can be sent, then all unacknowledged
+CRYPTO data sent in Initial packets should be retransmitted.  If no data can be
+sent, then no alarm should be armed until data has been received from the
+client.
+
+Because the server could be blocked until more packets are received, the client
+MUST ensure that the crypto retransmission timer is set if there is
+unacknowledged crypto data or if the client does not yet have 1-RTT keys.
+If the crypto retransmission timer expires before the client has 1-RTT keys,

```suggestion
If the PTO timer expires before the client has 1-RTT keys,
```

>    if (has unacknowledged crypto data
       || endpoint is client without 1-RTT keys):
-    // Crypto retransmission timer.
+      // Crypto retransmission deadlock timer.

```suggestion
      // Initial PTO.
```

> @@ -1203,10 +1199,10 @@ SetLossDetectionTimer():
     // Time threshold loss detection.
     loss_detection_timer.update(loss_time)
     return
-
+    
   if (has unacknowledged crypto data

I think this if condition can go.

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