Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Encrypt key phase (#1339)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Tue, 08 May 2018 00:57 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Encrypt key phase (#1339)
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kazuho commented on this pull request.



> +secrets.  A packet protection key is used to protect the packet number from
+casual observation.  The packet number protection key is derived from the first
+packet protection secret using the label "pn".  This key is produced using the
+same process as the AEAD key and IV, but the value is not updated with each key
+update ({{key-update}}).
+
+~~~
+pn_key = QHKDF-Expand(pp_secret<0>, "pn", pn_key_length)
+~~~
+
+That is, for the algorithms defined in this document, the packet protection key
+is determined to be:
+
+~~~
+client_pn_key  = QHKDF-Expand(client_pp_secret<0>, "pn", 16)
+server_pn_key  = QHKDF-Expand(server_pp_secret<0>, "pn", 16)

My understanding is that `pp_secret` only exists for 1-RTT. Do we need to define similar constructs for handshake secret and 0-RTT secret?

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