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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)

David Schinazi <notifications@github.com> Wed, 08 May 2019 00:13 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)
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DavidSchinazi commented on this pull request.



> @@ -724,6 +703,36 @@ This results in abandoning loss recovery state for the Initial encryption level
 and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
 
 
+### Discarding Handshake Keys
+
+An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
+confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
+keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most applications protocols
+will send data after the handshake, ensuring the peer can discard their
+handshake keys promptly.  Applications protocols that do not MAY send
+ACK-eliciting frames encrypted with 1-RTT keys as soon as they have installed
+those send keys and until they receive an acknowledgment for one of them,
+ensuring the peer can discard their handshake keys.

Fixed

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