Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticating connection IDs (#3439)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Thu, 05 March 2020 06:32 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BFF93A0E04 for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 22:32:02 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.696
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.696 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MAILING_LIST_MULTI=-1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vqNMTiKxigNq for <quic-issues@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 22:32:01 -0800 (PST)
Received: from out-1.smtp.github.com (out-1.smtp.github.com [192.30.252.192]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 020F63A0E03 for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 22:32:00 -0800 (PST)
Received: from github-lowworker-cd7bc13.ac4-iad.github.net (github-lowworker-cd7bc13.ac4-iad.github.net [10.52.25.102]) by smtp.github.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95850C60DAC for <quic-issues@ietf.org>; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 22:31:59 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1583389919; bh=onh1IxDKw8uidWBDQCE7mepA8ImC/I/YKnc5rDPJFOo=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=rSQDBY9kC+WqU67ZWfSIxg4xpm9++aIAUk5lhtk7e7KWmNlCmV7fAYxRCXicB+zl4 wpqGfZSj3j3UrUoTryCDI5wTzVHQ1DiviGgDGv1mBLxsufoZWcjsLplgCnlaG2czGH IaCknkPXtVoWFMFVDT0v2Cvu1pMIIBQRlwtIHIDU=
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 22:31:59 -0800
From: Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: quicwg/base-drafts <reply+AFTOJK5S2NUNARK5F7UNBIF4NR657EVBNHHCC4LIRI@reply.github.com>
To: quicwg/base-drafts <base-drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3439/595052750@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3439@github.com>
References: <quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3439@github.com>
Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Authenticating connection IDs (#3439)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_5e609cdf87720_10d83fcd69acd96c3066ae"; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: martinthomson
X-GitHub-Recipient: quic-issues
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: quic-issues@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic-issues/lQddFfFsvjPan_2myzRg0tgbNTg>
X-BeenThere: quic-issues@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Notification list for GitHub issues related to the QUIC WG <quic-issues.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic-issues/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic-issues@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic-issues>, <mailto:quic-issues-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 05 Mar 2020 06:32:02 -0000

@DavidSchinazi,

> I'm not sure we should be discouraging servers from using client-generated connection IDs. We've been doing that for years and I'm not sure there is a credible attack here.

The problem is not with what you are doing, but a consequence of adding Retry to the protocol. In addressing the problems arising from that we can ask servers to make a small sacrifice in terms of requiring them to generate a new connection ID, something they need to know how to do anyway. Or, we can ask clients to conditionally validate server behaviour.

I appreciate that if you have no need to send Retry, this might be an imposition on the server, but from the outside it seems totally doable. I would like to understand less about the strength of your reluctance to offer a new connection ID and more about why it might be difficult to do so.

Is this expensive because you have to consult with load balancers?

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3439#issuecomment-595052750